THE MODERN SEA WOLF AUTOMATIC WAS INTRODUCED IN 1964 AT THE WORLDS FAIR
OF ITS DESIGN, RELIABILITY, RUGGEDNESS, DEPENDABILITY AND PRICE OF 100.00.
South Vietnamese troops in action near Tan Son Nhut Air Base
FROM THE WORLDS FAIR TOUS GOVERNMENT MILITARY PX/BX INSTALLATIONS, THE MARKETING COMMOTION WAS A SUCCESS AND IT SOON CONVINCED MANY US SOLDIERS, INCLUDING ARMY ***GREEN BERET, PILOTS, NAVY SEALS AND MEMBERS OF UNDERWATER DEMOLITION TEAMS, THAT THE SEA WOLF WAS NOT A PAMPERED TIME PIECE.
VIET-CONG W/ NEW AK47 & US FIELD RADIOS
PIC FREE SOURCE WIKIPEDIA
THOUGH THE UNITED STATES ACTIVELY ASSISTED THE FRENCH FROM 1945 TO 1955, AND HAD ADVISORS AND AIR FORCE PERSONAL ACTIVELY INVOLVED, THE US VIETNAM CONFLICT DATES FROM 1959 TO APRIL 30, 1975. DURING THE KENNEDY PRESIDENCY, THE GREEN BERET ORGANIZATION WAS FORMED AND ADVISERS WERE SENT TO ASSIST THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE. THESE “ADVISERS” ACTUALLY FOUGHT ALONG SIDE SOUTH VIETNAMESE SOLDIERS.
IT WAS THE GREEN BERET “ADVISORS”, COVERT OPERATIVES AND SUPPORT TROOPS OF THE MID 1960’S WHO WOULD PROVE THE RUGGED REPUTATION OF THE ZODIAC SEA WOLF IN THE JUNGLES AND WATERWAYS OF VIETNAM AND MAKE THE SEA WOLF POPULAR AMONG THE HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF TROOPS WHO BEGAN ARRIVING IN 1965 AFTER THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ALLEGEDLY FIRED UPON TWO US SHIPS IN THE GULF OF TONKIN. IN RESPONSE TO THE GULF OF TONKIN INCIDENT OF AUGUST 2 & 4 1964, PRESIDENT JOHNSON ESCALATED THE VIETNAM SUPPORT MISSION TO A CONFLICT BY SENDING U.S. GROUND TROOPS TO VIETNAM–THOUGH IT TOOK 6 MONTHS FOR RESOLUTIONS TO PASS AND THE U.S. MILITARY TO RESPOND.
ON MARCH 8, 1965, THE FIRST US TROOPS ARRIVED IN VIETNAM. IN THE FORM OF 3500 U.S. MARINES LANDED NEAR DA NANG
THIS 1966 ZODIAC SEA WOLF NON-DATE VERSION WAS AVAILABLE AT MILITARY BX/PX AND ON R&R IN 7 COUNTRIES. IN FACT, MUCH OF THE RUGGED REPUTATION OF THE SEA WOLF BY ZODIAC WAS AWARDED BY ITS POPULARITY AMONG US TROOPS IN THE VIETNAM WAR. ITS RUGGEDNESS, DEPENDABILITY AND PRICE MADE IS A TOP CHOICE. THE SEA WOLD WAS NOT A PAMPERED TIME PIECE.. ON THE CONTRARY.. IT IS THE FACT OF ITS DESIGN AND RELIABILITY THAT WON THE SEA WOLF POPULARITY.
NOTE THAT IT STATES: ” WHITE OR BLACK RADIUM DIAL, SWEEP HAND”
THIS ZODIAC SEA WOLF IS THE EARLY POPULAR NON-DATE VERSION
THE DIAL HAS BEEN COMPLETELY RESTORED
EXACTLY AS IT WAS IN 1966
THE TRIANGULAR 6-9 & 12 MARKERS WITH
NUMBERS IN BLACK ARE RE-LUMED
THE CENTERS OF THE HOUR MARKERS
THE ORIGINAL STEEL HANDS
AND TRIANGLE BEZEL ARE RE-LUMED
ORIGINALLY RADIUM ILLUMINATED
THE RADIUM HAS BEEN REM,OVED AND REPLACED
20 ATM ESPECIALLY
STAINLESS STEEL IN EXCELLENT CONDITION
NEW ORIGINAL PLEXIGLAS CRYSTAL
CASE IS IN EXCELLENT RESTORED CONDITION
STEEL BALL BEARING BEZEL CLICK
LATER MODELS USED A RED JEWEL AS THE BEZEL CLICK
17J ZODIAC MOVEMENT
MILITARY PX VERSION
[DOES NOT DENOTE DATE]
11.5”’, Dm= 25.6mm
f = 21600 A/h
power reserve 40h
– EXCELLENT TO FINE –
WATCH WINDS SETS & KEEPS TIME
THE US WAS WINNING THE WAR
The decision signaled the end of a bitter, decade-long debate within the Party leadership between first two, and then three factions. The moderates believed that the economic viability of North Vietnam should come before support of a massive and conventional southern war and who generally followed the Soviet line of peaceful coexistence by reunifying Vietnam through political means.
Planning in Hanoi for a winter-spring offensive during 1968 had begun in early 1967 and continued until early the following year. There has been an extreme reluctance among communist historians to discuss the decision-making process that led to the General Offensive General Uprising, even decades after the event. In official North Vietnamese literature, the decision to launch Tet Mau Than was usually presented as the result of a perceived U.S. failure to win the war quickly, the failure of the American bombing campaign against the North Vietnam, and the anti-war sentiment that pervaded the population of the U.S. The decision to launch the general offensive, however, was much more complicated.
The decision signaled the end of a bitter, decade-long debate within the Party leadership between first two, and then three factions. The moderates believed that the economic viability of North Vietnam should come before support of a massive and conventional southern war and who generally followed the Soviet line of peaceful coexistence by reunifying Vietnam through political means. Heading this faction were party theoretician Tru?ng Chinh and Minister of Defense Võ Nguyên Giáp. The militant faction, on the other hand, tended to follow the foreign policy line of the People’s Republic of China and stridently called for the reunification of the nation by military means and that no negotiations should be undertaken with the Americans. This group was led by Party First Secretary Lê Duan and Lê Ðuan Tho (no relation). From the early to mid-1960s, the militants had dictated the direction of the war in South Vietnam.
General Nguyen Chí Thanh the head of Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), communist headquarters for the South, was another prominent militant. Strangely, the followers of the Chinese line believed in their strategy against the US and its allies on large-scale, main force actions rather than the protracted guerrilla war espoused by Mao Zedong.
By 1966-1967, however, after suffering massive casualties, stalemate on the battlefield, and destruction of the northern economy by U.S. aerial bombing, there was a dawning realization that, if current trends continued, Hanoi would eventually lack the resources necessary to affect the military situation in the South. As a result, there were more strident calls by the moderates for negotiations and a revision of strategy. They felt that a return to guerrilla tactics was more appropriate since the U.S. could not be defeated conventionally. They also complained that the policy of rejecting negotiations was in error. The Americans could only be worn down in a war of wills during a period of “fighting while talking.” During 1967 things had become so bad on the battlefield that Lê Du?n ordered Thanh to incorporate aspects of protracted guerrilla warfare into his strategy.
During the same period, a counterattack was launched by a new, third grouping (the centrists) led by President Ho? Chí Minh, Lê Ðuc Tho, and Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh, who called for negotiations. From October 1966 through April 1967, a very public debate over military strategy took place in print and via radio between Thanh and his rival for military power, Giáp.Giáp had advocated a defensive, primarily guerrilla strategy against the U.S. and South Vietnam. Thanh’s position was that Giáp and his adherents were LEFTed on their experiences during the First Indochina War and that they were too “conservative and captive to old methods and past experience… mechanically repeating the past.”
The arguments over domestic and military strategy also carried a foreign policy element as well, because North Vietnam was totally dependent on outside military and economic aid. The vast majority of its military equipment was provided by either the Soviet Union or China. Beijing advocated that North Vietnam conduct a protracted war on the Maoist model, fearing that a conventional conflict might draw them in as it had in the Korean War. They also resisted the idea of negotiating with the allies. Moscow, on the other hand, advocated negotiations, but simultaneously armed Hanoi’s forces to conduct a conventional war on the Soviet model. North Vietnamese foreign policy, therefore consisted of maintaining a critical balance between war policy, internal and external policies, domestic adversaries, and foreign allies with “self-serving agendas.”
To “break the will of their domestic opponents and reaffirm their autonomy vis-à-vis their foreign allies” hundreds of pro-Soviet, party moderates, military officers, and intelligentsia were arrested on 27 July 1967, during what came to be called the Revisionist Anti-Party Affair.
The leadership in Hanoi must have been initially despondent about the outcome of their great gamble.Their first and most ambitious goal, producing a general uprising, had ended in a dismal failure. In total, approximately 85,000–100,000 communist troops had participated in the initial onslaught and in the follow-up phases. Overall, during the “Border Battles” of 1967 and the nine-month winter-spring campaign, 45,267 communist troops had been killed in action\
The horrendous losses inflicted on Viet Cong units struck into the heart of the irreplaceable infrastructure that had been built up for over a decade. MACV estimated that 181,149 Viet Cong and North Vietnamese troops had been killed during 1968. From this point forward, Hanoi was forced to fill one-third of the Viet Cong’s ranks with North Vietnamese regulars.
However, this change had little effect on the war, since North Vietnam had little difficulty making up the casualties inflicted by the offensive.
Some Western historians have come to believe that one insidious ulterior motive for the campaign was the elimination of competing southern members of the Party, thereby allowing the northerners more control once the war was won.
All of the arrests were based on the individual’s stance on the Politburo’s choice of tactics and strategy for the proposed General Offensive. This move cemented the position of the militants as Hanoi’s strategy: The rejection of negotiations, the abandonment of protracted warfare, and the focus on the offensive in the towns and cities of South Vietnam. More arrests followed in November and December.
After cementing their position during the Party crackdown, the militants sped up planning for a major conventional offensive to break the military deadlock. They concluded that the Saigon government and the U.S. presence were so unpopular with the population of the South that a broad-based attack would spark a spontaneous uprising of the population, which, if the offensive was successful, would enable the communists to sweep to a quick, decisive victory. Their basis for this conclusion included: a belief that the South Vietnamese military was no longer combat effective; the results of the fall 1967 South Vietnamese presidential election (in which the Nguy?n Van Thi?u/Nguy?n Cao K? ticket had only received 24 percent of the popular vote); the Buddhist crises of 1963 and 1966; well-publicized anti-war demonstrations in Saigon; and continuous criticism of the Thieu government in the southern press. Launching such an offensive would also finally put an end to what have been described as “dovish calls for talks, criticism of military strategy, Chinese diatribes of Soviet perfidy, and Soviet pressure to negotiate—all of which needed to be silenced.”
The Tet Offensive was a massive surprise attack on American and South Vietnam forces, bases , and key strategic targets, and Vietnam cities, towns and hamlets. by the Vietcong and North Vietnamese forces, on scores of cities, towns, and hamlets throughout South Vietnam on the . It was considered to be a turning point in the Vietnam War. Not so much from the actual attacks, because the North lost, but because theAnti War effort in the US was able to use the TET OFFENSIVE to falsely describe it as proof the US was losing the war.
Tet Nguyên Ðán, more commonly known by its shortened name Tet or “Vietnamese Lunar New Year”, is the most important and popular holiday and festival in Vietnam. It is the Vietnamese New Year marking the arrival of spring based on the Lunar calendar, a lunisolar calendar. Celebrated on the same day as Chinese New Year, many Vietnamese prepare for Tet by cooking special holiday foods and cleaning the house, visiting a person’s house on the first day of the new year, ancestral worshipping, wishing New Year’s greetings, giving lucky money to children and elderly people, and opening a shop. It is also an occasion for pilgrims and family reunions. The New Year begins on the first night of the first moon after the sun enters Aquarius. This is sometime between January 21 and February 19 on the solar calendar.
US and AVN Forces and the Vietcong and North Vietnam agreed to a cease fire in celebration of the 1968 TET, which began on January 30, 1968. Many US soldiers were given leaves of absence, and South Vietnam, in general, relaxed their normal preparedness.
Mean while, with Ho Chi Minh nearing death, and the Vietcong and NVA losing massive amounts of men and arms, the North Vietnamese believed that the only means to victory was an all-out military effort. The North Vietnamese agreed to the cease-fire, while having planned, supplied and trained over 85,000 Vietcong and North Vietnamese Regular Army (NVA) , troops, to launch a major offensive throughout South Vietnam, on first day of the Lunar New Year , January 31, 1968.
TET OFFENSIVE BEGINS
The first wave of attacks began shortly after midnight on 30 January as all five provincial capitals in II Corps and Da Nang, in I Corps, were attacked.
Nha Trang, headquarters of the U.S. I Field Force, was the first to be hit, followed shortly by Ban Me Thuot, Kontum, Hoi An, Tuy Hoa, Da Nang, Qui Nhon, and Pleiku.
During all of these operations, the communists followed a similar pattern: mortar or rocket attacks were closely followed by massed ground assaults conducted by battalion-strength elements of the Viet Cong, sometimes supported by North Vietnamese regulars.
These forces would join with local cadres who served as guides to lead the regulars to the most senior South Vietnamese headquarters and the radio station.
The operations, however, were not well coordinated at the local level. By daylight, almost all communist forces had been driven from their objectives. General Phillip B. Davidson, the new MACV chief of intelligence, notified Westmoreland that “This is going to happen in the rest of the country tonight and tomorrow morning.
All U.S. forces were placed on maximum alert and similar orders were issued to all ARVN units. The allies, however, still responded without any real sense of urgency. Orders canceling leaves either came too late or were disregarded.
At 03:00 on the morning of 31 January communist forces assailed Saigon, Cholon, and Gia Dinh in the Capital Military District; Queng Tre, Hue, Quang Tin, Tam Ke, and Queng Ngãi as well as U.S. bases at Phú Bài and Chu Lai in I Corps; Phan Thiet, Tuy Hòa, and U.S. installations at Bong Son and An Khê in II Corps; and Cen Tho and Vinh Long in IV Corps.
The following day, Biên Hòa, Long Thanh, Bình Duong in III Corps and Kien Hoa, Dinh Tuong, Go Cong, Kien Giang, Vinh Binh, Ben Tre, and Kien Tuong in IV Corps were assaulted.
The last attack of the initial operation was launched against Bac Lieu in IV Corps on 10 February.
A total of approximately 84,000 communist troops participated in the attacks while thousands of others stood by to act as reinforcements or as blocking forces. Communist forces also mortared or rocketed every major allied airfield and attacked 64 district capitals and scores of smaller towns.
In most cases the defense against the communists was a South Vietnamese affair. Local militia or ARVN forces, supported by the National Police, usually drove the attackers out within two or three days, sometimes within hours; but heavy fighting continued several days longer in Kontum, Buôn Ma Thuet, Phan Thiet, C?n Tho, and Ben Tre.
The outcome in each instance was usually dictated by the ability of local commanders— some were outstanding, others were cowardly or incompetent. During this crucial crisis, however, no South Vietnamese unit broke or defected to the communists.
According to Westmoreland, he responded to the news of the attacks with optimism, both in media presentations and in his reports to Washington. According to closer observers, however, the general was “stunned that the communists had been able to coordinate so many attacks in such secrecy” and he was “dispirited and deeply shaken.”
According to Clark Clifford, at the time of the initial attacks, the reaction of the U.S. military leadership “approached panic”.
Although Westmoreland’s appraisal of the military situation was correct, he made himself look foolish by continuously maintaining his belief that Khe Sanh was the real objective of the communists and that 155 attacks by 84,000 troops was a diversion (a position he maintained until at least 12 February).
Washington Post reporter Peter Braestrup summed up the feelings of his colleagues by asking “How could any effort against Saigon, especially downtown Saigon, be a diversion?”
It took weeks for U.S. and South Vietnamese troops to retake all of the captured cities, including the former imperial capital of Hue.
Hue was the Imperial Capitol of Vietnam between 1802 and 1945, when the last Emperor Bao Ðai abdicated and a communist government was established. In 1968, it housed the ruins of the imperial capital of the Nguyen Dynasty and was well known for its monuments and architecture. Its population back then was about 140,000 people.
The city was overrun by communist forces which initially totaled approximately 7,500 men. Both sides then rushed to reinforce and resupply their forces. Lasting 25 days, the battle of Hue became one of the longest and bloodiest single battles of the Vietnam War.
In the battle 16 to 18 communist battalions (8,000-11,000 men) were taking part in the fighting for the city itself or the approaches to the former imperial capital.
In the aftermath of the recapture of the city, the discovery of several mass graves (the last of which were uncovered in 1970) of South Vietnamese citizens of Hue sparked a controversy that has not diminished with time. The victims had either been clubbed or shot to death or simply buried alive. The official allied explanation was that during their initial occupation of the city, the communists had quickly begun to systematically round up (under the guise of re-education) and then execute as many as 2,800 South Vietnamese civilians that they believed to be potentially hostile to communist control.
216 U.S. Marines and soldiers had been killed during the fighting and 1,609 were wounded. 421 ARVN troops were killed, another 2,123 were wounded, and 31 were missing. More than 5,800 civilians had lost their lives during the battle and 116,000 were left homeless out of an original population of 140,000.
Although Saigon was the focal point of the offensive, the communists did not seek a total takeover of the city. Rather, they had six primary targets to strike in the downtown area: the headquarters of the ARVN General Staff at Tan Son Nhut Air Base; the Independence Palace, the US Embassy, Saigon, the Long Binh Naval Headquarters, and the National Radio Station. These objectives were all assaulted by small elements of the local C-10 Sapper Battalion. Elsewhere in the city or its outskirts, ten Viet Cong Local Force Battalions attacked the central police station and the Artillery Command and the Armored Command headquarters (both at Go Vap). The plan called for all these initial forces to capture and hold their positions for 48 hours, by which time reinforcements were to have arrived to relieve them.
The US Embassy, Saigon, a massive six-floor building situated within a four acre compound, had only been completed in September. At 02:45 it was attacked by a 19-man sapper team that blew a hole in the 8-foot-high (2.4 m) surrounding wall and charged through. With their officers killed in the initial attack and their attempt to gain access to the building having failed, the sappers simply occupied the chancery grounds until they were all killed or captured by US reinforcements that were landed on the roof of the building six hours later.
Throughout the city, small squads of Viet Cong fanned out to attack various officers and enlisted men’s billets, homes of ARVN officers, and district police stations. Provided with “blacklists” of military officers and civil servants, they began to round up and execute any that could be found.On 1 February General Nguy?n Ng?c Loan, chief of the National Police, publicly executed Viet Cong officer Nguyen Van Lem captured in civilian clothing in front of a photographer and film cameraman. What was not explained in the wake of the distribution of the captured images was that the suspect had allegedly just taken part in the killing of one of Loan’s most trusted officers and his family
Except at Hu and mopping-up operations in and around Saigon, the first surge of the offensive was over by the second week of February. The U.S. estimated that during the first phase (30 January – 8 April), approximately 45,000 communist soldiers were killed and an unknown number were wounded. For years this figure was held as excessive, but it was confirmed by Stanley Karnow in Hanoi in 1981. Westmoreland claimed that during the same period 32,000 communist troops were killed and another 5,800 captured. The South Vietnamese suffered 2,788 killed, 8,299 wounded, and 587 missing in action. U.S. and other allied forces suffered 1,536 killed, 7,764 wounded, and 11 missing.
The attack on Khe Sanh, which began on 21 January, may have been intended to serve two purposes—as a real attempt to seize the position or as a diversion to draw American attention and forces away from the population LEFT in the lowlands, a deception that was “both plausible and easy to orchestrate.” In General Westmoreland’s view, the purpose of the Combat Base was to provoke the North Vietnamese into a focused and prolonged confrontation in a confined geographic area, one which would allow the application of massive U.S. artillery and air strikes that would inflict heavy casualties in a relatively unpopulated region. By the end of 1967, MACV had moved nearly half of its maneuver battalions to I Corps in anticipation of just such a battle.
Khe Sanh and its 6,000 U.S. Marine Corps, Army, and ARVN defenders were surrounded by two to three North Vietnamese divisions, totaling approximately 20,000 men. Throughout the siege, which lasted until 8 April, the allies were subjected to heavy mortar, rocket, and artillery bombardment, combined with sporadic small-scale infantry attacks on outlying positions. With the exception of the overrunning of the U.S. Special Forces camp at Lang Vei, however, there was never a major ground assault on the base and the battle became largely a duel between American and North Vietnamese artillerists, combined with massive air strikes conducted by U.S. aircraft. By the end of the siege, U.S Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy aircraft had dropped 39,179 tons of ordnance in the defense of the base