|Date/Report Number …..030114.LHMVTNMW113 Item: 1968 HAMILTON GS-W-113 PILOT/AIRBORNE MILITARY ISSUE HACKING WRIST WATCH.|
|Description of item: VINTAGE1968 HAMILTON GS-W-113 PILOT/AIRBORNE MILITARY ISSUE HACKING WRIST WATCH. LATE 1960-EARLY 1970 TRIPLE STRAP CUFF STYLE WATCH STRAP WITH AIRBORNE PATCH MILITARY COLLAR SQUARE
.Estimated Retail Replacement Value $899.00 [WITH CUFF]
|Reports are supplied at the request of the customer and it is for the customer’s exclusive use. Reports express an opinion of the time of the examination of the jewelry. This report is for customers use only for the following two purposes, indicating estimated retail replacement value to obtain insurance coverage, or for the purpose of providing geological information. goldsmith Works does not guarantee that the appraisal valuation will result in a sale at the price. Estimated retail replacement value is arrived after analyses of what the approximate high retail cash asking price is for labor, materials, and design. These prices may be substantially higher than actual transaction or warranty with regards to any item described in the report, since jewelry grading is not an exact science, this report represent the best opinion of the company. GoldSmith Works is in no case responsible for differences that occur by repeated grading by other experts in the field and/or use of other standards, norms, methods or criteria other than those used by GoldSmith Works. GoldSmith Works is expressly held harmless by customers including, but with out limitation for any claims or actions that may arise out of negligence in connection with the preparation of this laboratory report, or actions based upon the customer’s use of the report. The information on the carat weight, clarity grade, color grade on the report is approximate due to the limitations in jewelry grading. The item was tested, graded, and examined under 10x magnification using the techniques and equipment available to GoldSmith Works, including fully corrected triplet loupe, binocular microscope, master color comparison guides, diamond color comparison tools, electronic carat balance, non-contact optical measuring device, and ancillary instruments necessary at the time of Exam|
LATE 1960-EARLY 1970
MILITARY COLLAR SQUARE
1967: HACKING = PILOTS
1967: NON-HACKING = US MARINES
1968/1969: AIRBORNE HACK
HACKING WRIST WATCH
13 – 24
EARLY VIETNAM VERSIONS
LATER PILOTS VERSION
OF THE GS-W-113
LACKED THE “H3” AND PROPELLER
SHAPED RADIATION MARKER TO
ALLOW GREATER VISIBILITY
DIAL ALL ORIGINAL EXCEPT RE-ILLUMINATED TRIANGULAR MARKERS
HACKING WRIST WATCH
ISSUED BY THE
33 X 40
HANDS AND MARKERS
HERE DIAL MARKERS DRYING
EVEN IN THE BRIGHT 1-5 STUDIO LIGHTS THE AF-LUMINOVA GLOWS
A PHOSPHOROUS AND ZINC COMPOUND THE SAME USED IN WWII
ABOARD GERMAN SUBMARINES. IN THE BOOK
THE AUTHOR, ONE OF ONLY A FEW WHO SURVIVED 1934 THROUGH 1945
U BOAT CAPTAIN AND POW THEN US CITIZEN
WATCHES/TIMERS WERE COATED WITH THIS FORMULA
ON EVERY SUB WAS A CHARGING STATION,WITH FLORESCENT LIGHT
WHICH CHARGED THE COATED DIAL WHICH
ILLUMINATED WATCHES AND TIMERS
GET THE BOOK!@
IS NOT SURPLUS
IT WAS WORN IN THE NAM
HAS EXTENSIVE TRENCH ART
IT WAS A
ROCK INVESTED IN
5 YEARS AGO
BATTLE OF HAMBURGER HILL
A PERSONAL LONGINES WAS CHOSEN
CASE HAS SOME USE WEAR
DUE THE FACT IT WAS IN THE NAM FOR THREE TOURS
ROCK HAS THE ABILITY TO DUPLICATE
THE LOOK OF THE PARKERIZED FINISH AROUND BEZEL
OF THIS ABSOLUTE ONE PIECE CASE
BUT IF YOU ARE LOOKING FOR MINT CASE
WAIT CAUSE ROCK RESTORES THEM ALSO,
BUT I CAN ASSURE YOU
IT WILL NOT HAVE SERVED IN COUNTRY
1968 – 1970
The Battle of Hamburger Hill During The Vietnam War occurred from May 10 thru May 20 1969. Fought by the US Airborne with ARVN [South Vietnamese Troops –Including Rangers] against NVA/VPA [North Vietnamese Army / Vietnamese Peoples Army], the object was a heavily fortified hill named Hill 937.
Though Hill 937 had no actual strategic value, the U.S. command ordered its capture mainly to prove something and add the killed and wounded Vietnamese to thier balance sheets [Vietnam vet’s opinion]. The problem was that Commanders ordered a WWII Full Frontal Up The Hill Assault.
US and Vietnamese forces would attack up the well fortified hill populated by fierce, well trained and experienced North Vietnamese Regulars who were dug in at the top and along the ridges with an abundance of of weapons and ammunition. Primarily an artillery engagement on the side of the US with Airborne troops moving up the steeply-sloped hill against entrenched troops, each attack was repeatedly repelled by Vietnam People’s Army Defenses ..and the weather.
Airborne troops eventually took the hill through the ordered direct assault, and suffered such extensive casualties that back home, in the USA, Hamburger Hill –aptly named so for the carnage suffered by Airborne Troops” as they were chopped in hamburger” like the Battle of Pork Chop Hill during the Korean War. –would be a call of unity by anti-war forces on the streets and in the capitol of the United States of America.
option: hack feature
11.5”’, Dm= 25.6mm, Do= 26.0mm
f = 21600 A/h
1.2 miles from the Laotian border, dominating the northern valley, the battle took place on Dong Ap Bia in the rugged, jungle-shrouded mountains of South Vietnam. Rising from the floor the A Shau Valley, Ap Bia Mountain, 937 meters (3,074 ft) above sea level, is a massive being unconnected to the ridges of the surrounding Annamite range.
Local tough Montagnard tribesmen called it “the mountain of the crouching beast”. Snaking downwards from it’s peak, a series of ridges and fingers populate the surrounding areas.
A rugged, uninviting wilderness blanketed in canopies jungle for single to dounble and even triple thickness along with dense thickets of bamboo and elephant grass from waste high to taller than an M113 Armored Personnel Carrier, it remains today a foreboding wilderness against any foe.
In May 1969, during Operation Apache Snow, a three-phased campaign intended to destroy the base of the North Vietnam Army (NVA) in the remote A Shau Valley.
The second part of the campaign was intended as a series of operations to neutralize the NVA in A Shau Valley which remained an infiltration route into South Vietnam prior to 1966.
This was when the North Vietnamese seized the Special Forces camp in the valley during the Battle of A Shau. Since then the NVA had maintained a permanent presence.
The US Commander of XXIV Corp, Lieutenant General Stilwell, decided to amass nearly two divisions of Airborne and affiliated troops supported by artillery and air support to accomplish the task. Meanwhile, the North Vietnamese, were moving their 3rd, 6th, 9th, and 29th Regiments into the area to recover from their losses in a previous battle against US Marines in February. Thus the stage was set.
Assigned to Apache Snow were three airborne infantry battalions of the 101st Airborne Division, commanded by Major General Melvin Zais. These units of the division’s 3rd Brigade (commanded by Colonel Joseph Conmy) were the 3rd Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment (Lt. Col. Weldon Honeycutt).
[google goldsmithwatchworks 11th airborne, the 187th started out as an 11th airborne in WWII, regiment served as only airborne Korea, then Vietnam]; 2nd Battalion, 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment (Lt. Col. Robert German); and the 1st Battalion, 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment (Lt. Col. John Bowers).
Two battalions of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam’s (ARVN) 1st Division (the 2/1st and 4/1st) had been temporarily assigned to the 3rd Brigade in support. Other major units participating in Apache Snow included the 9th Marine Regiment; and 3rd Squadron, 5th Cavalry Regiment and the 3rd ARVN Regiment.
reconnaissance in force was what Colonel Conmy characterized the operation as. Five battalions to “combat assault” into the valley by helicopter and search assigned sectors for PAVN troops and supplies.
The overall plan of attack called for the Marines and the 3/5th Cavalry to reconnaissance in force toward the Laotian border while the ARVN units cut the highway through the base of the valley.
The 501st and the 506th were to destroy the enemy in their own operating areas and block escape routes into Laos. Any heavy contact with North Vietnamese Troops would be met with reinforcements by way of helicopter.
Colonel Conmy expected that the 101st could reposition its forces quickly enough to keep the PAVN from massing against any one unit, while a U.S. battalion discovering a North Vietnamese unit would fix it in place until a reinforcing battalion could lift in to cut off its retreat and destroy it.
Previous experience and intelligence in the A Shau assured that serious resistance from the Peoples Army of Vietnam [ PAVN]. Yet no known strength or dispositions of PAVN units were available. The PAVN and NVA were masters of camouflage. I cannot say with enough writing just what this mean other than to say that the North Vietnamese concealed their bases so well, that even aerial surveillance over and over never produced any intelligence. PAVN forces moved only at night and along jungle trails shielded by triple-canopy jungle. Command and control was by runner and wire, leaving no electronic signature to monitor or trace.
Commanders of the US teams, troops, platoons, companies and battalions had to generate their own tactical intelligence by combat patrol. Primary and Secondary intelligence was afforded only through the manual capture and on the ground discovery of equipment, installations, documents, and the occasionally prisoners of war to provide the raw data from which to draw their order of battle and dispositions. During the first four days of the operation, time-consuming, hit-or-miss task forces who hit the field in attempt to gain that elusive information so critical to a successful conclusion, characterized the main efforts of Colonel Honeycutt’s 3/187th Infantry
Honeycutt was a protégé of General William C. Westmoreland, the former commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam. General William C. Westmoreland had been removed after the TET offensive demonstrated his failure in the field. Later his main stratigy of counting bodies also demonstrated his failure to understand the Vietnam Enemy.. A focus on body count simply opened the door to fraud. Well, there is ore than this simple explanation. But bottom line, Westmoreland was in fact the commander of all forces in the Nam and failed ..and so did his underlings….Honeycutt had, by way of replacement of many of its officers, given it a personality to match his own aggressiveness. His stated intention was to locate the PAVN force in his area of responsibility and engage it before it could escape into Laos.
Though the operation began with a routine they had become familiar with: light contact greeting forward platoons, the 101st Airborne Division was not aware that documents captured by 3/187th indicated the 29th PAVN Regiment, nicknamed the “Pride of Ho Chi Minh” and a veteran of the 1968 Tet Offensive assault on Hue, was somewhere in the valley. Large encounters with PAVN meant the North Vietnamese would resist violently for a short time and then withdraw before the Americans brought overwhelming firepower to bear against them. Yet Honeycutt still anticipated his battalion had sufficient capability to carry out a reconnaissance on Hill 937 without further reinforcement- although his own Bravo Company was held in reserve.
On May 13, the brigade commander, Colonel Conmy, made a move to cut off North Vietnamese reinforcement from Laos and assist Honeycutt by attacking Hill 937 from the south. Bravo company was heli-lifted to Hill 916, but the remainder of the battalion made the movement on foot, from an area 4 kilometers (2.5 mi) from Hill 937, and both Conmy and Honeycutt expected the 1/506th to be ready to provide support no later than the morning of May 15. Although Bravo Company seized Hill 916 on May 15, it was not until May 19 that the battalion as a whole was in position to conduct a final assault, primarily because of nearly impenetrable jungle.
Incurring heavy casualties, the 3/187 conducted multi-company assaults on May 14 & 15. The 1/506th made probing attacks on the south slopes of the mountain on May 16 & 17. The terrain and well organized North Vietnamese forces continually disrupted U.S. tactical operations on Hills 916, 900, and 937. On top of that, the commanders failed to .note that Helicopter redeployment was not simply impractical because of the steep gradients and dense vegetation. The mountains and hills and surrounding areas provided few natural LZs…LET ALONE anywhere on its slopes or fingers.
While hindering the use of helicopters in offensive and defensive measures, the terrain also masked the positions of the NVA 29th Regiment, making it nearly impossible to suppress anti-aircraft fire; the jungle covered the movement of North Vietnamese units so completely that it created a nonlinear battlefield: NVA soldiers, able to maneuver freely around the LZs, shot down or damaged numerous helicopters with small arms fire, rocket-propelled grenades, and crew-served weapons.
The North Vietnamese also assaulted nearby logistical support LZs and command posts at least four times, forcing deployment of units for security that might otherwise have been employed in assaults. Attacking companies had to provide for 360-degree security as they maneuvered, since the terrain largely prevented them from mutually supporting one another. NVA platoon- and company-sized elements repeatedly struck maneuvering U.S. forces from the flanks and rear.
Then came the facts to the questions never sufficently solved through on the ground intelligence gatheringm: The ability of US Forces to manuver was limited by narrow trails. These trails continued to funnel what would be a successfukl company attack into into squad or platoon points of attack, where PAVN platoons and companies would blunt them with prepared fields of fire. On topof that, it became more and more a small arms engagements at close range thereby severely restricting U.S. fire support. Units had to frequently pull back and call in artillery fire, close air support, and ARA, but the North Vietnamese had had plenty of time , years in fact, to construct well placed and constructed bunkers with overhead cover to withstand bombardment.
During the course of the battle the foliage would eventually be stripped away and the bunkers exposed; but that further demonstrated that they were so numerous and well constructed that many of them simply could not be destroyed by indirect fire. In fact even with Napalm and Recoil less Rifle Fire was of no use.
Only persistent squad and platoon-level actions would eventually account for the reduction of most of the fortifications. And this was the greatest cause of casualties, When I Say Only Persistant Means A SLOW WWII STYLE BUNKER TO BUNKER OFFENSIVE–YET IN THE JUNGLES RATHER THAN THE OPEN SOUTH PACIFIC , with losses in KIA. WIA, MAI unanticipated by THOSE BEHIND THE BATTLE COMMANDERS..
Another problem of this Vietnam Style of battle plan of relying on U.S. troops without intelligence to attack a group of forces in their back yard with WWI trench mentaily and no intelligence was that the overall command and strategy of utilization of small units became essentially decentralized. Honeycutt constantly demanded his company commanders push on with out the “mutual” support of other units until the final assaults– when those companies left could maneuver in close proximity over what was then a barren mountain top.
Fire support for units in contact was also decentralized. Supporting fires, including those controlled by airborne forward air controllers, were often directed at the platoon level. Eventually human error led to five attacks by supporting aircraft on the 3/187th, killing seven and wounding 53. Four of the incidents involved Cobra gunship helicopters, which in one case were more than 1 kilometer (0.62 mi) away from their intended target.
The Associated Press learned of the ongoing battle on Hill 937 and after interviews asked why were bombers and/or artillery used instead of men? It was then that the term “Hamburger Hill” became widely used. The U.S. brigade commander in return ordered a coordinated two-battalion assault for May 18.. Fighting to within 75 meters (246 ft) of the summit, Delta Company 3/187th nearly carried the hill but experienced severe casualties, including all of its officers. The battle was one of close combat, with the two sides exchanging small arms and grenade fire within 20 meters (66 ft) of one another.
Losses had been severe, with approximately 320 killed or wounded, including more than sixty percent of the 450 experienced troops who had assaulted into the valley. Two of its four company commanders and eight of twelve platoon leaders had become casualties. Yet from a light observation helicopter, the battalion commander attempted to coordinate the movements of the other companies into a final assault, but an exceptionally intense thunderstorm reduced visibility to zero and ended the fighting.
Because of the heavy casualties already sustained by his units and under pressure from the unwanted attention of the press, the Commander seriously considered discontinuing the attack but decided otherwise. Both the corps commander and the MACV commander, General Creighton W. Abrams, publicly supported the decision. Three fresh battalions were committed to the battle The battalion commander of the 2/506th, Lt. Col. Gene Sherron, arrived at Honeycutt’s CP on the afternoon of May 18 to coordinate the relief. 3/187th was flying out its latest casualties, and its commander had not yet been informed of the relief. Before any arrangements were made, after a sharp confrontation,Honeycutt argued that his battalion was still combat effective, he was assigned one additional company as reinforcement for the next assault.
Two fresh battalions—the 2/501st Infantry and ARVN 2/3d Infantry—were airlifted into LZs northeast and southeast of the base of the mountain on May 19. Both battalions immediately moved onto the mountain to positions from which they would attack the following morning. Meanwhile the 1/506 for the third consecutive day struggled to secure Hill 900. The 3rd Brigade launched its four-battalion attack at 10:00 on May 20, including two companies of the 3/187 reinforced by Alpha Company 1/506. The attack was preceded by two hours of close air support and ninety minutes of artillery prep fires. The battalions attacked simultaneously, and by 12:00 elements of the 3/187 reached the crest, beginning a reduction of bunkers that continued through most of the afternoon. Some PAVN units were able to withdraw into Laos, and Hill 937 was secured by 17:00.
The 2nd Battalion, 3rd Regiment] of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam’s 1st Division participated in the battle. General Creighton W. Abrams in “The Abrams Tapes”, says the unit was positioned on a stretch of the NVA defense line that was lightly defended, and sent a scout party to test the forward enemy lines earlier than the proposed assault time; this party was quickly able to discern the minimal enemy strength. The 2/3 ARVN commanding officer decided to exploit the situation, and attack in advance of the other units. The 2/3 ARVN reached the crest of Hamburger Hill around 10:00, ahead of the 3/187th, but was ordered to withdraw from the summit, allied artillery was to be directed on to the top of the hill. The opportunity to threaten the NVA lines facing the 3/187th was lost. Shortly after the 2/3 ARVN completed their withdrawal, the 3/187th was able to break through the NVA defenses and occupy the summit
U.S. losses during the ten-day battle totaled 72 KIA and 372 WIA. To take the position, the 101st Airborne Division eventually committed five infantry battalions and ten batteries of artillery. In addition, the U.S. Air Force flew 272 missions and expended more than 500 tons of ordnance. U.S. claimed the 7th and 8th Battalions of the 29th NVA Regiment suffered 630 dead (discovered on and around the battlefield); including many found in makeshift mortuaries within the tunnel complex.
Major General John M. Wright quietly abandoned the hill on June 5. The debate over Hamburger Hill reached the United States Congress, with particularly severe criticism of military leadership by Senators Edward Kennedy, George McGovern, and Stephen M. Young. In its June 27 issue, Life Magazine published the photographs of 241 Americans killed in one week in Vietnam; considered a watershed event of negative public opinion toward the Vietnam War. While only five of the 241 featured photos were of those killed in the battle, many Americans had the perception that all of the photos featured in the magazine were casualties of the battle.The controversy of the conduct of the Battle of Hamburger Hill led to a reappraisal of U.S. strategy in South Vietnam. As a direct result, to hold down casualties, General Abrams discontinued a policy of “maximum pressure” against the North Vietnamese to one of “protective reaction” for troops threatened with combat action, while simultaneously President Richard Nixon announced the first troop withdrawal from South Vietnam.
WATCH WINDS SETS & RUNS IN ALL MODES